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Abstract 
Today, Africa is laced with some of the most obstinate conf licts, most 
of them constructed from differences in religious and ethnic identities. 
Religious and ethnic nationalism has led to conf licts about control of state 
power, unequal allocation of resources, citizenship issues, state collapse, 
economic decline and ethno-religious clashes. Nigeria has been pushed 
hither and thither by recurrent crises of regional or state illegitimacy, often 
impairing efforts at economic transformation, democratisation, national 
cohesion and stability (Osaghae and Suberu 2005:4). With this continental 
background in mind, this research paper seeks to examine the relationship 
between religion, ethnicity and conf lict in Nigeria, focusing mainly on 
issues in the North of the country. The question is: To what extent are 
conf licts emerging from ethnic or religious sources? This paper also looks 
at the notion of Identity and how it explains the crisis of development and 
complexities in modern Nigeria. 
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Introduction
Nigeria is synonymous with deep divisions which cause major political 
issues to be vigorously and violently contested along the lines of intricate 
ethnic, religious and regional divisions. Issues that raise the most dust 
are those regarded essential for the existence and the validity of the state. 
Opposing and contending assemblages have a tendency to assume an 
exclusionary winner-take-all approach. These issues include the control of 
state power, allocation of resources and citizenship. As a result, states with 
such divisions are disposed to be delicate and unstable because almost by 
definition, they have very little in common with regard to convergence and 
harmony which are necessary to reduce the centrifugal forces that rip them 
apart (Osaghae and Suberu 2005:4). 
Therefore, breakdown, breakaway, civil strife, civil war, minority 
nervousness, and violent clashes, all of which would typically be regarded 
unusual in normal states are common forces or actual occurrences in 
divided states (Osaghae and Suberu 2005:4). Because of a complicated 
network of politically silent identities, coupled with a history of protracted 
and seemingly stubborn wars and instability, Nigeria is high on the list as 
one of the most unstable states in Africa. Since its independence, Nigeria 
has been driven hither and thither by recurrent crises of regional or state 
illegitimacy, often impairing efforts at democratisation, stability, economic 
transformation and national cohesion. A peak of the crisis appears to have 
occurred during the civil war of the 1960s, which began shortly after 
independence (Okpanachi 2010). Since 1999 when Nigeria transited into 
civilian rule, the country has witnessed a rapid increase in the number 
of conf licts. The aim of this study is to examine the relationship between 
religion, ethnicity and those conf licts in the country. It looks at the notion 
of Identity in an attempt to explain the crisis of development and the 
complexities of modern Nigeria.
A high level of corruption and the looting of state resources is another 
serious and ‘pandemic’ (Dike 2005) problem that makes all forms of 
conf lict and trouble worse in Nigeria. The country is ‘richly endowed 
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with natural resources and high quality human capital’ (Ogbeidi 2012:1), 
but corruption is one of the main reasons that affect the development of 
the country in a negative way. The appropriation of state resources by 
certain hands makes poverty and bitter anger inevitable aspects of daily 
socio-economic and political routine. In this sense, though corruption 
is not peculiar to Nigeria, many sources call it the ‘bane of the country’ 
(Dike 2005; Ogbeidi 2012:21). And of course, corruption is considered to 
be one of the main causes of ethno-religious conf licts (Nwankwo 2015). 
Poverty and injustice caused by corruption weaken any sense of mutual 
tolerance, social solidarity or coexistence, while reawakening social hatred, 
radicalism and violence. For this reason, corruption is seen as one of the 
most important issues that has to be resolved in order to cope with ethno-
religious conf licts in Nigeria. 
The identity factor
From a socio-political perspective, ‘identity’ bears a personal and a social 
meaning. Processes related to identity are ‘located at the core of the 
individual and yet in the core of his community culture’ (Erikson 1968:57; 
Okpanachi 2010). Thus, identity can be said to be an individual’s ‘sense 
of belonging to a group if (it) inf luences his political behavior’ (Erikson 
1968:57; Mary Anderson 2010; Okpanachi 2010). Identity is built into an 
individual’s physiological ‘givens’ and in social roles (Erikson 1968:57; 
Okpanachi 2010). Identity is characterised by features such as an ‘emotive 
tie to a group’, ‘love and belief for a group’, ‘pledge to a cause’, and 
‘commitments and duties to a group’ with which a person identifies (Smyth 
and Robinson 2001:7–11; Okpanachi 2010).
General studies in identity underscore the fact that identity implies 
similarity and contrast at the same time (Jenkins 2004; Okpanachi 2010). 
‘For an individual, or for a group, there may be a plurality of identities. 
Yet, such a plurality is a source of stress and contradiction in both self-
representation and social action. This is because identity must be 
distinguished from role-sets’ (Okpanachi 2010).
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According to Castells, notions of identity are present only when social 
actors co-opt them (Okpanachi 2010; Castells 2010:8). Oftentimes, self-
definition of identity overlaps with role expectations, but identities are 
more stable springs of meaning than those social roles. This is because 
identities establish the meaning, while social roles shape the functions 
(Okpanachi 2010; Castells 2010:7). However, identity is not uniform 
or stable among groups or individuals. Its strength and importance is 
dynamic and differs from group to group. While identities are somewhat 
stable, identity consciousness keeps on changing to ref lect the f luctuating 
role of the identities and the swelling magnitudes (Jega 2000:11; Okpanachi 
2010). This elasticity of identity avoids coming up with an all new identity 
for the particular role and circumstance. Social forces, then, strongly affect 
identity building and formation (Okpanachi 2010). 
Recent studies on religious identity have also underscored the positive 
function of religion in promotion of peace. On the other hand, however, 
mobilisation of identity has been used to incite political groups to struggle 
and religious groups to legitimise wars and various modes of brutal and 
violent acts (Alger 2002:101; Okpanachi 2010).
Politics of ethnic identity in Nigeria
Ethnicity is a social phenomenon that is manifested in interactions among 
individuals of different ethnic groups within a political system where 
language and culture are the most prominent attributes. The formation 
of dialects within languages was one of the ways in which ethnicity – both 
small-scale and large-scale – became fixed in Nigeria. Although there are 
over 400 languages in Nigeria, only three are considered important while 
the rest are considered minor languages. However, the distribution of these 
languages is directly proportional to both political and socio-economic 
power, and therefore the language group to which one belongs defines his/
her status in the society. Missionaries and local politicians created standard 
languages and hoped that they would homogenise language and ethnicity, 
and create more harmonious ethnic identities.
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Ethnicity is natural in almost all societies made up of more than one 
ethnic group. This observation tends to offer the suggestion that the 
interaction between different ethnic groups within a single political set-up 
generates ethnic identity. An interaction of this kind can create ‘a common 
consciousness of being one in relation to other relevant ethnic groups’ 
(Eriksen 1996:30). That in turn, results in the emergence of in-group and 
out-group confines which come to be guarded jealously over time. Based 
on this approach, ethnicity thus becomes a process through which ethnic 
identities are politicised (Eriksen 1996:30).
Historically, identities have played a significant role in the Nigerian 
political process during the colonial period and in the post-colonial era. 
During the colonial period, the administrators allowed the emergence 
and aggravation of an ‘us’ versus ‘them’ syndrome, where Muslims were 
pitted against Christians, Northerners against the Southerners, Hausa-
Fulani, Yoruba and Igbo against each other, and so on (Adefemi 2003:14; 
Okpanachi 2010). In this era religious and ethnic differences became 
prominent factors in instituting and executing socio-economic strategies 
and applications. Therefore, the differentiating outcomes of colonialism 
became the forerunner of the socio-economic disequilibrium among 
the different regions, and then this became an important factor in the 
stimulation of identity awareness so as to efficiently ‘divide and rule’ 
(Fearon and Laitin 2003:82; Okpanachi 2010). But, as a counter argument 
it must be said that internal factors are more determinant than the external 
ones in creating the cleavages in Nigeria. This is also the case in many other 
countries.  
Ethnicity is seen as the most basic and politically salient identity of 
Nigerians. This argument is based on the premise that in their competitive 
and non-competitive contexts, Nigerians tend to define themselves in 
terms of ethnic affinities as opposed to other identities (Osaghae and 
Suberu 2005:8). A survey conducted in Nigeria by Lewis and Bratton found 
that almost half of Nigerians (48.2%) labelled themselves with an ethnic 
identity compared to 28.4% who labelled themselves with respect to class 
and 21% who identified with a religious group (Lewis and Bratton 2000:27; 
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Osaghae and Suberu 2005:9). This means that over 66% of Nigerians view 
themselves as members of an elemental ethnic or religious group. What 
is even more interesting is the fact that religious and ethnic identities are 
more salient than class identities (Lewis and Bratton 2000:26; Osaghae 
and Suberu 2005:9). However, this is not at all that surprising, especially 
if one considers that ethno-religious formations are the most persistent 
behavioural units in Nigeria (Nsongola-Ntalaja 2004:404; Osaghae and 
Suberu 2005:9). 
Nevertheless, notwithstanding the fact that ethnicity is the most salient, 
and the large number of studies conducted on this issue, the total number 
of ethnic groupings in Nigeria remains unknown (Osaghae and Suberu 
2005:9). Some sources put it at 374 (Otite 1990:34; Okpanachi 2010), while 
some other sources count more than 250 different ethnic identities (Central 
Intelligence Agency 2016). However, the population percentages of the 
majority of these groups are small when compared with the seven largest 
ethnic groups constituting about 88% of the country’s population. These 
are Hausa and Fulani (29%), Yoruba (21%), Igbo (18%), Ijaw (10%), Kanuri 
(4%), Ibibio (3,5%), and Tiv (2,5%) (Central Intelligence Agency 2016). 
This population disproportion when combined with the disparities in the 
political influence of individual ethnic groups roughly classifies the Nigerian 
population into two major groupings: the majority and minority ethnic 
groups. When the Hausa-Fulani, the Yoruba and the Igbo form the majority, 
the rest of the ethnic groups are fitted into the minority classification which 
in itself possesses different degrees of status relative to their size and political 
influence (Rakov 1990; Paden 2008:4; Okpanachi 2010).
The Hausa-Fulani and other smaller ethnic groups that inhabit the north 
of the country are Muslims while the Igbo and the other smaller groups 
residing in the South are primarily Christians. Groups lying in the middle 
comprise a mixture of Christians and Muslims while the Yoruba found in 
the Southwest are almost half Muslim and half Christian. This Muslim 
North and Christian South cleavage enhances ethnic fractionalisations 
in Nigeria, especially in Northern Nigeria where Islamic identity plays a 
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dominant role (Paden 2007:8; Okpanachi 2010). It is clear that nearly the 
entire Northern half of the country consists of states with Sharia law.
Of course, exceptions should not be overlooked for both parts of the 
country. There is a considerable population of Muslims in the South, 
especially in the Southwest, and a sizeable number amongst the Benin in 
Edo State. Even in the Southeast, amongst the Igbo, there has been a rising 
number of Muslims, causing the governors of some Igbo-speaking states 
to introduce state programmes for Muslims. The same goes for Christians 
in the North, where the considerable number of Christians cannot be 
disregarded in any analysis of religious groupings in Nigeria.
Lewis (2007:6) attributes the historical prominence of Islam during the 
formation of Northern states in the early 19th century to the continued 
prominence of Emirs and religious authorities in framing identities in 
Northern Nigeria. Lewis argues that a number of principles of ethnicity 
are used by political leaders and others to frame their arguments as to how 
things should be accomplished. First, ethnic identity is the most important 
and consistent basis of social identity in the country. Second, ethnicity 
is seen as a way for collective action. Finally, ethnicity is presumed to 
be a destabilising factor with far-reaching impacts on democracy. These 
principles breed a number of outcomes. Because political competition is 
played along lines of ethnicity, the resultant ‘democratic’ but authoritarian 
government ostensibly has an ethnic character (Lewis 2007:2). 
Lewis states that civilian governments supposedly promote the creation 
of an ethnic politicisation and political schism. On the other hand, non-
democratic regimes like military rules are usually repercussions from the 
side of the political elite. In most cases, therefore, mechanisms of political 
governance are formed on the basis of ethnicity via custom-made patronage 
systems (Lewis 2007:2). For instance, in Nigeria the ethnic factor is seen when 
political parties are formed and during elections. The Northern People’s 
Congress (NPC) was formed in the first Republic and it was a Hausa-Fulani 
party. Similarly, the Igbos belonged to the National Council of Nigeria and 
Cameroon (NCNC) while the Yoruba prided themselves as members of the 
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Action Group (AG) (Cohen 1968). These parties later transformed into 
The National Party of Nigeria (NPN), the Nigerian People Party (NPP) and 
the Unity Party of Nigeria (UPN) during the second republic (Edoh 2001:87). 
The third Republic, attributed to the Social Democratic Party (SDP) and 
National Republican Convention (NRC), was disbanded by annulment of 
the June 12, 1993 elections due to ethnic reasoning when it became clear 
that the Northern political hegemony risked being lost forever. Thus, here 
it is possible to detect that stimulation of ethnic awareness easily turns 
into a conf lict in order to get more from scarce societal resources. And 
this situation provokes political tensions and cleavages among the ethnic 
groups. Nigeria is not the only country in the world where such things are 
experienced. 
In recent times, socio-economic and political changes have taken place 
and transformed the delineations of identities and politics in Nigeria. To 
begin with, patterns of group mobilisations have shifted. In the traditional 
models of Nigerian ethnic politics, emphasis was on competition among 
the country’s three largest groups – the Hausa-Fulani, the Yoruba and the 
Igbo. The minority groups comprising over 250 smaller ethnic groups have 
often been regarded as inconsequential in political contests. However, since 
1999, Nigeria’s political arena has been changing following political action 
by groups in the Niger Delta and the ‘middle-belt’ communities who have 
increasingly become vocal in national politics and economy (Soludo 2007). 
Ethnic solidarity has also faced opposition from religious mobilisations by 
the Muslims and the Christians especially in the Muslim North.
Since the restoration of democratic rule, ethnic identity and mobilisation 
in the Nigerian political landscape has often resulted in political instability. 
Between 1999 and 2013, more than 11 000 deaths have occurred as a 
result of more than five hundred incidents of communal violence. Ethnic 
violence has been witnessed in almost all regions in the country but with 
particular frequency in the Niger Delta, the Muslim North and Northwest, 
and along the middle-belt (Uzodike and Whetho 2011:220). The level of 
insecurity witnessed during the post-military period is considerably higher 
than that experienced during the three decades of military rule that ended 
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in 1999. It is often assumed that there exist stable identities in Nigeria 
and consistent group motives in the approach to ethnic politics (Rotberg 
2002:88). However, the upsurge of ethnicity in Nigeria in recent years leads 
researchers to re-examine identity formation.
Religious identity
Nigeria is the most crowded African country with a population of about 
182 million by 2015 (World Population Prospects 2015:21). A majority 
of the scientific academic sources accept that the half of the population 
is Christian, the other half Muslim. However, there is uncertainty about 
the exact percentages, hence various sources give different figures. In 
a report published by Pew Research Center in 2010 the numbers from 
different sources are compared in the report’s Appendix B. If we mention 
them chronologically for instance, the 1963 Census certified 36% 
Christian, 48% Muslim and 16% other. However, the Demographic and 
Health Survey gave 53% Christian, 45% Muslim and 2% other in 2008. 
Similarly, Afrobarometer found 56% Christian, 43% Muslim and 1% 
other, also in 2008. And finally, Pew Forum declared 46% for Christians, 
52% for Muslims and 1% for others in 2009 (Pew Research Center 2010). 
Whatever the exact percentages are, it is clear that Nigeria is a country 
with very large Christian and Muslim populations. This situation makes 
this country a potential fault line between the two different identities and 
even civilisations. In this sense, Nigeria, with the largest Christian plus 
Muslim population in the world, can be defined as a ‘cleft country’ and 
then a ‘test case’ of Huntington’s Clash of Civilisations thesis (Paden 2007; 
Olojo 2014:7).
Although the general presumption is that ethnic identity is a more 
prominent and stable source of identity in Nigeria, some researchers 
have demonstrated that religion was more significant than ethnicity as 
a source of identity and conf lict in Nigeria (Ruby and Shah 2007; Pew 
Research Center 2010; Green 2011). In fact, in the Hausa-Fulani North, 
religious identity is more pronounced than ethnic identity and only serves 
to stimulate ethnicity (Osaghae and Suberu 2005:10). Therefore, of the 
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two major ethnic groupings in the country, the Yoruba are more likely to 
identify themselves with their ethnic group than are the Northern Hausa-
Fulani (Lewis and Bratton 2000:20; Osaghae and Suberu 2005:11). 
Nigeria has three major religious identities: Christian, Islam and 
traditional religions (Omorogbe and Omohan 2005:557; Osaghae and 
Suberu 2005:11). Traditional religions are the most politically inactive 
of the three groups, ‘numbering several hundreds of ethnic groups and 
sub-groups, villages, clans and kin groups; and, involving the worship of 
different gods and goddesses’ (Osaghae and Suberu 2005:11). On the other 
hand, Christian and Muslim identities have continued to be the backbone 
of religious disparity and conf lict (Lewis and Bratton 2000:5; Osaghae and 
Suberu 2005:11). This differentiation underlies the North-South cleavage.
It is worth noting that, within the wide Christian and Muslim categories, 
there lie many sub-cleavages and intra-group conf licts that have either been 
active politically in the past or have a potential of being salient in the future. 
Among the Christians, sub-cleavages include the Protestants (Anglican 
10%, Baptist 8%, Methodist 5%, and Lutheran 5%), the Catholics 15%, 
the Evangelical Church of West Africa 2%, Jehovah’s Witnesses 5% and a 
myriad of other local (Aladura, Cherubim and Seraphim, Celestial Church 
of Christ 20%) and Pentecostal churches 30% (Osaghae and Suberu 
2005:11).
The Pentecostal churches form the fundamental division of Christianity in 
Nigeria which has experienced rapid growth in numbers of followers in the 
last few years with the majority of adherents, especially the youths, joining 
the church from the older and more traditional denominations. The church 
has played an important role in civil society in anti-military struggles and 
democratisation. This has been made possible through umbrella bodies such 
as the Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN), the Pentecostal Fellowship 
of Nigeria (PFN), and the Catholic Bishops Conference (Osaghae and 
Suberu 2005:11). However, politicisation of Christianity has been reliant 
on moves by the Muslims and the interventions of the government. Still, 
Protestant-Catholic cleavages have continued to play an important role in 
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elections among the Igbo communities living in the Southeast of Nigeria 
(Osaghae and Suberu 2005:11).
Muslims also belong to a number of sub-cleavages that include Ahmadiyya 
12%, Sanusiyya 5%, Tijanniyya 3%, and Quadriyya 8% which have in 
turn been in conf licts. And as among the Christians, the Muslims also 
have umbrella bodies which aim at propagating different understandings 
of Islam. Notable among these organisations is the Jamaatu Nasril Islam 
(JNI) which was established by Sardauna of Sokoto in 1961. Following 
events in Iran during the Islamic revolution of 1979, radical fundamentalist 
activities increased among Muslim youths. These conditions resulted in 
the formation of fundamentalist Muslim factions such as the Maitatsine, 
the Isala movement, the Shiites, the Talibans and most recently the Boko 
Haram (Fayemi 2011) which demanded the establishment of a purist 
Islam based on Sharia law, the abolition of unorthodox innovations, 
and the creation of an Islamic theocracy (Osaghae and Suberu 2005:11). 
These relatively new sentiments that depend on a unique and radical 
interpretation of Islam provoke conf licts with the traditional and/or more 
moderate understandings. 
Ethno-religious conflicts
The fact that an average Nigerian is very religious was observed by some 
sources (Oluduro 2010:209; Ekundayo 2013:29). Religion plays a critical 
role in Nigerian society and has expressed itself as a potent force in the 
geopolitical development of the country. This force which has been used 
to unite Nigerians is the same force that has led to numerous conf licts in 
the country. Nigeria has been engulfed in numerous religious crises and/or 
conf licts between 1980 and 19941 (Warner 2012:38). 
1 One of them was the Maitatsine revolt in 1980. Maitatsine’s original name was Mohammed 
Marwa and he was a religious preacher willing to impose his sui-generis religious ideology. 
‘Maitatsine’, in Hausa language means ‘the one who damns’. His militants, who were called 
as ‘Yan Tatsine’, attacked other religious groups in 1980. And later the Nigerian army was 
involved in the dispute and throughout the fights approximately 5 000 people were killed. 
Maitatsine also lost his life in the revolt.
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Due to their tendency to spread into other areas after an early stage in 
one area, ethno-religious conf licts have gained notoriety as the most 
violent crises in Nigeria. Most of these conf licts occur in the middle-belt 
and along the culturally borderline states of the predominantly Muslim 
North, and also take place between Hausa-Fulani groups and non-Muslim 
ethnic groups in the South (Osaghae and Suberu 2005:19). In conf licts 
of this nature occurring along the convergence of ethnic and religious 
lines, it is often very difficult to tell the differences between religious and 
ethnic crises because the dividing line between them is slimmer than thin. 
Examples of such ethno-religious conf licts are the Kafanchan-Kaduna 
crisis that occurred in the 1980s and 1990s, the Kaduna Sharia riots of 2000 
and the Jos riots of 20012 (Osaghae and Suberu 2005:19). Several hundred 
lives were lost during the Kaduna crisis of 2000 and the Jos insurrection of 
2001. The crises caused violent ripple effects that spread beyond Kaduna 
and Jos (Enukora 2005:633).
Other recent ethno-religious conf licts include the July 1999 conf lict 
among the Oro cultists in Sagamu in Ogun state who claimed that the 
Hausa women had come outside when the cultists were outside with their 
gnome. The result were arguments that finally turned into a full-scale 
crisis. Many Yoruba and Hausa people were killed before a dusk to dawn 
curfew was imposed on the Sagamu town. Even as the infamy was being 
put under check in Sagamu, reprisal attacks continued in Kano, in Hausa 
city, leading to deaths and destruction of property worth billions of Naira 
(Kura 2010:33–34).
Another ethno-religious conf lict that had far reaching impacts on the 
people of Nigeria was the October 2000 Lagos-Kano (Idi-Araba/Oko-
Oba) conf lict which was caused by a misperception between the Hausa 
2 In each of those conflicts, sides were keeping distinct religious plus ethnic identities. 
And therefore none of these crises could easily be classified as solely religious or ethnic. 
For example in the Kafanchan-Kaduna crisis in 1987, a conflict occurred between 
Christian and Muslim students from different ethnic groups, and the violence spread to 
some other regions. Extreme leaders from both sides played effective roles to motivate the 
young people to take part in this ethno-religious conflict. 
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inhabitants and the Yoruba living in Lagos over the use of a convenience 
by a man from Hausa. The mayhem resulted in the death of many Yoruba. 
As a consequence, the O'dua People Congress (a Yoruba militia) was formed 
and worsened the situation as the violence later spread southwards to Kano 
(Enukora 2005:633; Kura 2010:34).
Worse still, in September 2001, ethnic friction between the Tivs and the 
Iunkuns in the Plateau state reached fever pitch following what came to be 
referred to as ‘mistaken identity’. ‘What this means is that some Tivs took 
some nineteen soldiers to be Iunkuns in fake army uniform. The Tiv youths 
captured them and slaughtered them one by one’ (Kura 2010:34–35). 
And then the Nigerian army embarked on devastating reprisal attacks in 
Saki-Biam. According to some controversial numbers at least a hundred 
people died in the army attacks (Human Rights Watch 2001). Violence 
spread to Jos plateau especially after a Christian was appointed as a Local 
Council Chairman. By the time the menace was brought to a standstill, 
over 160 lives had been lost (Kura 2010:35).
A case of the North: Boko Haram
Between 1999 and 2013, numerous conf licts have been witnessed in 
Nigeria. The most important among them is the Boko Haram crisis 
which is on-going. This group has started a bloody campaign to impose a 
sui-generis Islamic regime based on Sharia in the Muslim North of the 
country. Actually, it is hard to argue that Boko Haram is a religious or 
ethnic conf lict. In the former case, it targets more Muslims than Christians. 
In the latter, it is mostly an ethnic Northern conf lict. For this reason, 
though Boko Haram uses a religious discourse, it may be more appropriate 
to call it simply a terrorist organisation.
With regard to the numerous conf licts and the Boko Haram menace in 
particular, the country’s stability is under constant threat. Boko Haram has 
introduced into Nigeria’s political and social life a level of insurgency never 
witnessed before. The insurgency became violent in 2008 even before the 
country could heal from previous ethno-religious conf licts (Shehu 2011:3).
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Boko Haram was founded in 2002 by Muhammad Yusuf. It is formally 
identified by its members as ‘Jama’at ahlis Sunnah lid Da’wat wal Jihad’, which 
means ‘people committed to the propagation of the Prophet’s teachings 
and jihad’. The name of the group ‘Boko Haram’ is loosely translated from 
the Hausa language to mean ‘western education is sinful’. This meaning 
is extended to mean any western culture is prohibited. It is for this reason 
that followers of this outfit advocate for a government based on Sharia as 
opposed to a democratic one. It is possible to count Wahhabism, Salafism 
and Islamic fundamentalism as the basic items of the Boko Haram’s 
ideology. The group which was founded in 2002 in Maiduguri did not 
become militant until 2009 when its leader was captured and killed by the 
Nigerian army. Since then, the group has engaged in gun battles, arson, 
bombing and stabbing, in promoting their ideology (Warner 2012:40). 
Moreover, Boko Haram has captured a territory in and around Borno state 
in the Northeast part of Nigeria in 2014. However, the territorial control of 
the group has been removed by the Nigerian army in 2015.
Boko Haram can be examined in various ways. Firstly, it refers to a long 
history characteristic of Northern Nigeria and the continued radical 
Islamic movements. Secondly, the group has its foundations in the socio-
economic marginalisation of the country’s northern population. Thirdly, 
Boko Haram is understood as seeking revenge especially in response to 
unacceptable behaviour of the law enforcers. The fourth understanding is 
based on the perception that Boko Haram is utilised by the elites from the 
North to express their grievances over lack of interest demonstrated by the 
central government. Finally, the group can be understood as developing as 
an offshoot of the Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and probably 
Al-Shabaab (Warner 2012:39). 
It is important to note that apart from the group targeting national events, 
markets and churches, they are sometimes engaged in sporadic bombings 
in major towns in Northern Nigeria including Kaduna, Saria, Jos, Kano, 
Maiduguri, and in Damaturi. During such instances, the fighters kill 
indiscriminately – Muslims and Christians alike. Despite everything, the 
group leaders have often stated that they are still fighting for justice and 
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the Islamisation of Nigeria (Roach 2012:4). The group has declared its 
allegiance to the Islamic State (IS), as has been done by a series of terrorist 
groups from various parts of the world. In this context, Boko Haram can be 
seen as yet another ref lection of the religious looking international terror 
campaigns now sweeping the globe scene. 
Inter-religious conflicts
Inter-religious conflicts in Nigeria form part of the dynamics of identity 
politics. Political elites in Nigeria have always sought to reap advantages 
from the multidimensional identities, more so during electioneering 
periods, and this has resulted in conflicts and instability. This politicisation 
of religious identities during contests for political office often lacks any 
sustaining unifying ideology. Somehow, politics in Nigeria are fashioned on 
the appeasement of religious motives. As a consequence, religion attains the 
level of deification that is difficult to challenge or overpower. In their quest 
to assume power and state resources, the elites constantly modify patterns of 
political domination. In this perpetually changing pattern of domination, 
fears and anxieties are bred that motivate an upsurge in struggle and 
intolerance (Ibrahim and Kazah-Toure 2003:18; Okpanachi 2010).
Since the return of civilian rule in 1999 following a protracted period of 
military rule, Nigeria has continued to experience recurring ethno-religious 
conf licts. Although some of these struggles are low-intensity contestations 
and rancorous wars of words, other have degenerated into bloody sectarian 
fights. Thousands of Nigerians have been left dead, wounded and homeless 
over the years due to constant religious strife pitting people of different 
religions against each other (Okpanachi 2010).
The main forms of inter-religious conf licts in Nigeria are between the 
Muslims and the Christians. The conf licts are sometimes so intense that 
they have turned into wars in different parts of the country, and they 
range from the Kano revolt (1980), Bulunktu Bisarre (1982), Kastina crises 
(1999), Samfara conf lict, Kaduna revolt, Bauchi crises and Sokoto (1999). 
More recent examples are the Jos crises and the current conf lict by Boko 
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Haram against Christians and moderate Muslims. These are only a few 
examples of inter-religious conf licts in Nigeria, since not a year passes 
without three to four incidences of inter-religious conf licts.
Inter-religious conf licts are brought about by a number of factors. 
One of these causes is the clashing interests of those in authority. The ruling 
class has applied a number of processes to express their dissatisfaction 
with exclusion from important decision-making processes of the country. 
The methods employed include religious violence and military coups d’état. 
A majority of the religious conf licts in Northern Nigeria are reported to 
be due to the large number of rich Southerners who reside there. Many 
Northern elites are hurt by the business inventiveness of the Southerners 
and employ religious calls to incite people to destroy property belonging 
to non-natives. The results are wars fought under the pretence of being 
religious (Falola 1998).
Major causes of ethno-religious conflicts in Nigeria
Unlike other forms of social conf licts, ethno-religious conf lict entails 
different ethnic groups that belong to different religions. It is essential 
to advert that both religious and ethnic causal agents have always acted 
together in the majority of social conf licts in Nigeria. At different levels 
and times in the past, the Nigerian people have complained of religious 
and ethnic discrimination. Most ask for religious and ethnic rights within 
their state. Another cause of the conf licts has been the state’s use of religion 
and ethnicity in political discourse or action. Therefore, it is clear that 
accusations and allegations of neglect, oppression and domination are the 
major causes that fuel ethno-religious conf licts (Ikelegbe 2001:14; Kura 
2010:35–36; Salawu 2010:348).
Nigeria, like many other countries in the world, lacks a consensus on how 
necessary changes and reforms are effected. This is caused by the fact 
that different religious and ethnic groups have varying benefits in which 
case some groups will have their interests met while others will not. This 
means that tension occurs when individuals who feel that they are deprived 
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attempt to increase their stake of power or wealth or to alter the central 
beliefs, values, norms and philosophies. In Nigeria therefore, there appears 
to exist a contentious interaction of politics, ethnicity and religions, 
which has resulted in an increased sense of belonging and militancy. It is 
important to note that the general outcome of this is the intensification 
of numerous ethno-religious struggles in Nigeria. And this intensification 
can be seen as the main source of ongoing discrimination, subordination 
and domination in this country (Kura 2010:36).
From one perspective, the ‘failure’ of the Nigerian political elite to enact 
good governments, promote national integration and foster good economic 
progress via thoughtful and pronounced policies has resulted in massive 
unemployment. This has in turn led to the rise of communal, ethnic and 
religious conf licts that are characteristic of the Nigerian politics. Since 
poverty and unemployment have acted as the mainstay for various ethno-
religious conf licts in the country, an accumulation of pauperised people 
can end up acting as paid militants. This could be the reason why any 
conf lict in Nigeria is usually characterised by a large number of fighters 
(Kura 2010:36; Mu’asu 2011:19–20).
There is a correlation between ethno-religious conf licts and low standards 
of democracy due to protracted military interferences in politics. This 
appears to legalise the application of coercion and violence as tools for social 
change and for the achievement of anticipated desires and objectives (Kura 
2010:37). Based on this understanding, it is common in Nigeria to observe 
that as a consequence or an after-effect of a military period, the application 
of both force and intimidation as a means of settling a misunderstanding 
has become very frequent. When this is coupled with easy acquisition of 
illegal fire arms, violence erupts more quickly and there is more difficulty 
in negotiating peaceful settlements.
The absence of vehicles of social control that were characteristic of 
traditional African societies, such as kinship, religious and political 
systems concerned with the well-being of the community, has led to the 
escalation of ethno-religious conf licts. The failure of these institutions is 
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partly to blame for the ethnic and communal conf licts witnessed in Nigeria 
today. Broken families and the inability to make ends meet in many homes 
have led to an increase in the level of immorality while at the same time 
providing a reservoir of youths who readily take up arms to execute ethno-
religious conf licts at a fee.
Conclusion
This study in one sense has tried to look at the emergence of identities and 
their impact on the conf licts in the most crowded African country, Nigeria. 
From social and political perspectives, ‘identity’ has a personal and social 
meaning. Identity can be defined as distinct qualities, characteristics and 
beliefs  of an individual or a group of people. And it is an individual’s sense 
of belonging to a group which often has an impact on his/her political 
behaviour (Erikson 1968:57; Mary Anderson 2010). 
Identity has been a significant aspect of the Nigerian political process, 
during the colonial period and in the post-colonial era. Ethnicity is a social 
phenomenon that is related to interactions among individuals of different 
ethnic groups within a political system where language and culture are the 
most prominent attributes. Both ethnicity and religiosity have emerged as 
the most basic and politically salient identities of the Nigerians.
In Nigeria, structures of political control are formed on the basis of ethnicity 
and religiosity via a custom-made patronage system. These identities have 
been a constant source of conf lict and cleavage in the country. Since the 
restoration of democratic rule, ethnic identity and mobilisation in the 
Nigerian political landscape has often resulted in political instability 
and constant conf licts. A number of uprisings and concomitant mayhem 
have been reported since 1999 and have resulted in the loss of thousands 
of lives and the destruction of property. In recent times, for instance, the 
militarisation of Boko Haram has undermined Nigeria’s stability and 
placed the country under constant threat. 
Despite some exceptions, such as the Yoruba being made up of both 
Christian and Muslim segments, ethnic identities generally overlap with 
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religious identities in Nigeria. For that reason, it is difficult to distinguish 
ethnic conf licts from religious ones in this country. However, it can be said 
that ethnic differences in Nigeria would not have been such a prominent 
cause of conf lict if they had not overlapped with the religious identities, 
or vice versa. In other words, in many instances, religion provides a 
mobilisation frame for conf lict and this effect is amplified when religious 
and ethnic cleavages run parallel. And there is no doubt that inter-religious 
conf licts in Nigeria form part of the dynamics of identity politics. As stated 
above, while some sources (Lewis and Bratton 2000) reveal the importance 
of ethnicity as a causal factor of cleavages, others (Ruby and Shah 2007; 
Pew Research Center 2010; Green 2011) underline religious identities as a 
more determinant element in the perception of difference. The diversity 
in the scientific findings and literature was probably caused by researchers 
focusing on different groups in Nigeria. Basically this means that for some 
groups ethnicity is more binding, while in others religion plays a dominant 
role in group identification and a sense of belonging. Since this paper has 
been mostly concentrated on conf licts in the North, the religious factor 
might be highlighted – due to the decisive religious cleavages in this region.
Of course, there is much ethno-religious conf lict in Nigeria, not only 
in the North and in the Delta, but also in the Middle Belt. However, the 
importance of the conf lict in the North comes from its global origin. It 
is apparent that this conf lict is a manifestation in Nigeria of religiously 
oriented global-scale violence. There are similarities between Boko Haram 
and other radical Islamist groups like Al-Qaeda, Al-Shabaab, Al-Nusra and 
the IS in terms of discourse and praxis. This makes the conf lict in the 
North more interesting for the rest of the world and this is the main reason 
for the emphasis on the subject in this paper.   
It is generally accepted that the inefficacy of politicians in Nigeria at 
the points of good governance, national consolidation and economic 
development has caused political cleavages, social disintegration and 
massive unemployment (Kura 2010:36; Mu’asu 2011:19–20; Ogbeidi 
2012:21). This, together with the absence of social control mechanisms and 
a high level of corruption, has stimulated ethno-religious conf licts. 
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Finally, the nation-state model is in danger in Nigeria, as in many other 
so-called nation-states. Of course, globalisation feeds this process, but the 
main reason is related to inherent features of the model. The majority of 
modern states consist of different groups and usually one of them tries to 
rule the system while provoking the objections of others. Consequently, 
the ethnic, religious and maybe ideological groups compete for dominance 
and this weakens the basis of any achieved unity. This is then seen as the 
inevitable character of heterogeneous nation-states (Gordon Anderson 
2010; Çancı and Şen 2010:290). 
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